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Written Testimony of Philip Hackney
Associate Professor of Law
University of Pittsburgh School of Law
U.S. Senate Finance Committee Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS
Oversight
Laws and Enforcement Governing the Political Activities of Tax-Exempt
Entities.
May 4, 2022
Chair Whitehouse, Ranking Member Thune, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me here today to speak with you about a matter of great importance to
the operation of the democratic order of the United States. I understand you have asked
me to speak to the issue of federal income tax laws and IRS enforcement related to the
political activity of tax-exempt entities.
I am an associate professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
where I primarily teach tax law courses. I specialize in the federal tax treatment of
nonprofit organizations. From 2006-2011, I worked in the Office of the Chief Counsel of
the IRS in Washington D.C. overseeing the tax-exempt sector. There I helped to oversee
the drafting of regulations, the overall program of auditing tax exempt organizations,
and IRS litigation on matters related to tax laws applicable to nonprofits and
government entities. That work necessarily interacted in a robust way with politics. The
IRS oversees dark money organizations, section 527 political organizations, and
charities that engage in politics in its largest sense. Today, I write, research, and speak
about these organizations and the regulatory regime applicable to them. 1
0F

I understand the committee is interested in whether the tax laws and IRS
enforcement are up to the task of overseeing the tax issues associated with the political
activities of tax-exempt organizations. While from my writing you can see that I think
the tax laws governing the tax-exempt realm are wanting, our overall legal structure is
not bad. It is justifiable at least. Where we fall down as a nation in this space is in the
enforcement. As I will discuss below, we do not allocate enough resources to this arena,
and we do not institutionally offer the support necessary to enforce these laws. These
failures do not favor one party over the other but favor those interests in the country
with the means and the willingness to abuse that structure. Primarily that redounds to
certain wealthy interests.
Within the tax structure of politics in its broadest sense it is worth noting that
neither political campaign expenditures nor lobbying expenditures are deductible under

I note that in addition to my experience at the IRS this testimony is informed in significant part by
articles I have written including Philip Hackney, Political Justice and Tax Policy: The Social Welfare
Organizations Case, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 271 (2021) [hereinafter Political Justice] and Philip Hackney,
Dark Money Darker? IRS Shutters Collection of Donor Data, 25 FLA. TAX REV. 140 (2021) [hereinafter
Dark Money Darker]. I also rely in small part on testimony I provided to the Pennsylvania House
Committee on Oversight February 7, 2022.
1
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the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). 2 In effect, Congress sees these as personal
expenditures that ought not receive a subsidy through the income tax. Indeed, Congress
forces the contributor of appreciated property, such as corporate stock, to a section 527
political organization to recognize gain on that transfer under the Code. 3 This is
distinctly different from most contributions of property. Gifts of appreciated property in
general do not trigger an income tax gain. 4
1F

2F

3F

In this testimony, first, I will describe the tax law that applies to these
organizations and then I will discuss the enforcement environment including both a
description of the resources available to the IRS and a discussion of the institutional
challenges faced by the IRS. As you will see in Part III, the IRS does not have the budget
to enforce the tax laws on the books, but also often fails to make use of simple
information to enforce these laws that matter both in collection of the revenue and our
democratic order.
I.

Tax-Exempt Organizations and Politics Introduction

The IRS tax-exempt division oversees a range of nonprofit entities that engage in
various types of political activity in its broadest sense. Some of the activities of these
organizations is also overseen by the FEC. The entities I will focus upon include section
527 political organizations, section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, section 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations, and section 501(c)(6) business leagues. 5
4F

When I say political activity in its broadest sense, I am referring to a combination
of intervention in a political campaign, lobbying, and activities close to both, sometimes
referred to as issue advocacy.
In tax law, intervention in a political campaign has its most salient meaning with
respect to charitable organizations. 6 This political campaign intervention prohibition is
colloquially referred to as the ‘Johnson Amendment’. It means the exempt organization
cannot participate or intervene, “directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.” 7 In other words, in
campaigns for public office (federal, state, and local) the charity itself cannot directly or
5F

6F

2 26 U.S.C. § 162(e). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the prohibition on deducting political campaign
expenses in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 (1959).
3 26 U.S.C. § 84.
4 See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, ¶ 40.3
(2021, WG&L). I have argued Congress ought subject contributions of appreciated assets to social welfare
organizations to the income tax on the gain just as it does to section 527 organizations under 26 U.S.C. §
84. See Political Justice, supra note 1, at 328.
5 Section 501(c)(5) labor unions might be listed here as well, but because of robust regulation and
disclosure regarding their activity via other regulatory bodies, the IRS role in oversight of these
organizations is much less significant. See, e.g., LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2012). Extensive reports about the financial activities of many labor unions are
available on the Department of Labor website, at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/olms/public-disclosureroom.
6 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii).
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indirectly encourage the public to vote for or against candidates. I use that definition
when I refer to political campaign intervention.
Lobbying refers to efforts to encourage members of a legislative body to propose,
support, or oppose legislation. 8 Finally, there is issue advocacy. In issue advocacy, an
organization may educate the public broadly about a political topic with the intention of
swaying the public toward a particular political solution. In its most specific context,
issue advocacy involves advocating about a political solution while simultaneously
identifying a candidate for office. Typically, these communications let the reader or
viewer draw their own conclusion about whether to vote for or against that candidate.
This sometimes leads to political campaign intervention.
7F

II.

Tax Exempt Organizations and Politics, the Law

This Part II will describe section 527 political organizations, section 501(c)(3)
charities, section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, section 501(c)(6) business
leagues, and then discuss information return obligations of tax-exempt organizations.
a. Section 527 Political Organizations
Prior to the 1970s, the IRS mostly ignored the tax implications of political
committees or organizations. 9 It saw the contributions to a political committee as a gift
and therefore non-taxable to the entity or individual. 10 Congress enacted section 527 of
the Code in 1975 to manage the taxable matters created by these political committees
and organizations. 11 In 2000 and 2002, Congress amended the statute to require
disclosure of donors from section 527 organizations that did not specifically come within
the FEC’s jurisdiction. 12
8F

9F

10F

11F

Political organizations are organized and operated primarily for what is called an
“exempt function.” An exempt function includes the “function of influencing or
attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political
organization.” 13 A section 527 organization still maintains a tax-exempt status, but is
subject to a complicated tax, primarily on its investment income. A section 527
organization that anticipates receiving gross receipts in excess of $25,000 a year
generally must give notice to the IRS within 24 hours of its establishment. 14 Unlike a
12F

13F

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii).
I.R.S., I. IRC 527 – Political Organizations, Exempt Organizations CPE Text (1989),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici89.pdf.
10 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810.
11 Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10, 88 Stat. 2108, 2116-19 (codified as amended at § 527); see
also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER SECTION 527 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2008), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21716/4.
12 P.L. 106-230; P.L. 107-276; see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER SECTION 527 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2008),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21716/4.
13 26 U.S.C. § 527.
14 They must file with the IRS a Form 8871 found here https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8871.
8
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social welfare organizations, a section 527 organization must publicly disclose
substantial information about its receipts of contributions and expenditures. 15 Congress
considered extending these same disclosure obligations to social welfare organizations
as well, but never has. 16 The IRS has provided guidance as to when certain activity is
considered an exempt function activity under section 527 for social welfare
organizations as well as business leagues and labor unions. 17 If a social welfare
organization, business league or labor union engages in activities categorized as exempt
function activity, the organization is subject to the tax under section 527(f). An
organization described in section 501(c) could alternatively create a segregated fund to
operate as a political organization under section 527. 18
14F

15F

16F

17F

b. Charitable Organizations
Charitable organizations are exempt from tax under section 501(a) of the Code as
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. 19 A charitable organization must be
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes, provided no part of the organization’s net earnings inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. 20 A charitable organization may not engage in more
than an insubstantial amount of lobbying and is completely prohibited from intervening
in a political campaign. 21 Finally, the organization cannot violate public policy. 22
18F

19F

20F

21F

An organization that qualifies as a charitable organization obtains a number of
important benefits. The first is that it is able to accept tax-deductible contributions from
its donors. 23 Though generally only relatively high-income donors are today able to
make use of the charitable contribution deduction, 24 where a donor is able to take
advantage of the deduction, the government effectively makes a big part of the
contribution to the charity – equal to the top marginal tax rate of the donor. 25 In other
22F

23F

24F

26 U.S.C. § 527(j). Note that Political Committees that already have the obligation to file with the FEC
do not have to comply with the section 527(j) disclosure requirements. See also Form 990, Return for
Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Schedule B Schedule of Contributors Instructions; Form 8872
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8872.
16 See, e.g., Donald Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the
Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 430 & FN 21 (2011) (citing H. Rep. No. 106-702, at 9–11 and
H. Rep. No. 106-702, at 40–41).
17 Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 328.
18 26 U.S.C. § 527(f)(3).
19 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) & (c)(3).
20 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
21 Id.
22 Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding organization not exempt from income tax as a
charitable organization because it violated public policy by racially discriminating against students by
restricting dating among students of different races).
23 26 U.S.C. § 170.
24 This is because Congress significantly raised the standard deduction in the 2017 Tax Act, Sec. 11021,
Pub.L. 115-7 (Dec. 22, 2017). The Tax Policy Center for instance estimates that it reduced the number of
households deducting their charitable contributions from 21% of households to about 9% of households.
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tcja-affect-incentives-charitable-giving
25 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE FEDERAL TAX
TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, JCX-2-22, 34 (March 17, 2022),
15
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words, if a donor had a 40% top marginal tax rate and made a $1,000 contribution to a
charitable organization, the government contributes $400 to the organization and the
donor contributes $600. Contributions to charitable organizations are also deductible
from the trust, gift, and estate taxes. 26 Additionally, a charitable organization generally
owes no tax on its earnings unless it operates an unrelated trade or business. 27 Charities
are allowed to issue tax-exempt bonds. 28 There are many other benefits that come with
the charitable designation at the federal, state and local level including exemptions from
property tax and state and local income tax.
25F

26F

27F

Though occasionally charitable organizations intervene in a political campaign in
a way that is clear, 29 many charitable organizations engage in political activity in its
broadest sense. In the political sphere, most charitable organizations rely upon either a
religious or educational purpose to support their claim to exemption. Religious
organizations will often assert that they are speaking from a religious perspective to
lobby, engage in issue advocacy, or sometimes to advocate for a candidate in a political
campaign. Educational organizations rely upon the fact that charitable educational
organizations can educate “the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial
to the community.” 30 There are many think tank advocacy groups that today qualify
under section 501(c)(3) by educating the populace about important ideas to our
governance. For instance, Heritage Foundation, the conservative think tank, is
recognized by the IRS as a charitable organization, 31 as is Center for American Progress,
the progressive think tank. 32 While I am not arguing that either of these organizations
engages in political campaign intervention, they are examples of organizations involved
in the broad sense of political activity.
28F

29F

30F

31F

As noted above, a charitable organization that seeks to maintain its exempt status
may not intervene in a political campaign. 33 This means that the organization’s
representatives when speaking for the charity may not directly or indirectly encourage
the public to vote for or against a candidate for political office. This definition is broader
than the election activity overseen by the FEC. 34 Notably, if the charity were able to
intervene in a political campaign, donors would have a means to deduct their political
campaign activity. More problematically, those in the highest tax brackets would be
32F

33F

https://www.jct.gov/publications/2022/jcx-2-22/ (making this essential point: “the value of the tax
deduction to the taxpayer is the amount of the donation multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate”).
26 26 U.S.C. §§ 642, 2055, and 2522.
27 26 U.S.C. § 511.
28 26 U.S.C. § 145.
29 See, e.g., Eugene Scott, Pastors Take to Pulpit to Protest IRS Limits on Political Endorsements, CNN
(October 1, 2016).
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3).
31 Heritage Foundation, Form 990 (2019),
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/237327730/02_2021_prefixes_2325%2F237327730_201912_990_2021021717708700.
32 Center for American Progress, Form 990 (2019),
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/300126510/02_2021_prefixes_2731%2F300126510_201912_990_2021021917725620.
33 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
34 The best statement from the IRS of what it views as a violation of this limitation is found in Rev. Rul.
2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
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most advantaged by such a system. In effect, this would mean the government would
support the political interests of the wealthy at forty cents on the dollar and most
everyone else at 0 cents on the dollar. The IRS has tools in the Code to apply a tax on a
charity, and its management, when the charity violates this limitation. 35
34F

Congress also limits the amount of lobbying in which a charity can engage. 36 The
Code provides that “no substantial part of the activities” can consist in “carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.” 37 The regulations
suggest that lobbying involves “contacting legislators or urging the public to contact
them to propose, support, or oppose legislation, or advocating the adoption or rejection
of legislation.” 38 It is not clear how much lobbying is too much to become a “substantial
part.” 39 Part of the challenge is determining how to think about activities. Similar to
political campaign intervention, should activities be measured in time, expenditure, or
something else? There is some guidance, as Congress has implicitly set that amount at
not greater than 20 percent of expenditures when it enacted section 501(h) of the
Code. 40 This allows charities to elect this regime such that the charity will know
beforehand whether or not it will be complying with the law. But charities who have not
elected the section 501(h) regime are still governed by the “substantial part” of activities
language.
35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

These limitations have passed Constitutional muster. For instance, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the limitation on lobbying under the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection clause in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation. 41 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated: “[w]e held that
Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying. In these cases,
as in Cammarano, Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated
any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s
lobbying.” 42 The Court highlights that those who run a charity have the option of also
operating a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization in order to engage in
substantial lobbying, simply without the ability for donors to deduct their
contributions. 43 In a footnote, the Court notes that the IRS allows the same people who
control the charity to also control the social welfare organization, as long as the
organizations scrupulously account for the monies and ensure no monies intended for
the charity are used to support the social welfare organization’s activity. 44 This theme of
40F

41F

42F

43F

26 U.S.C. § 4955. Additionally, in egregious situations, the IRS can take immediate action under 26
U.S.C. §§ 6852 and 7409.
36 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
37 Id.
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3). It also notes this applies as well to an organization whose purpose can
only be attained via legislation.
39 Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (finding a
range between 16.6% and 20.5% of total expenditures over four years to be a substantial part).
40 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(h) & 4911(c)(2).
41 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358
U. S. 498, 513 (1959)).
42 Id. at 546.
43 Id. at 544.
44 Id. at 544 FN 6.
35
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the flexibility of the tax exempt organization structure to accomplish various purposes
related to politics was relied upon by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the
Constitutionality of the prohibition on political campaign activity of a church in Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti. 45
44F

In addition to the political aspects of charities, much of the regulatory
architecture found in section 501(c)(3) works simultaneously to prevent fraud on charity
and prohibit evasion of income tax. For instance, Congress prohibits the inurement of
the earnings of the charity to a private shareholder or individual. 46 This both protects
funds set aside for charitable purpose and ensures that the organization is not operating
a tax shelter for the individuals who control the organization. The Code is designed to
only provide the benefits given to charitable organizations that are engaged in
benefitting the public and not avoiding the income tax. 47 In addition to the inurement
prohibition, Treasury regulations require that charities be operated for a public purpose
and not a private one. 48 This limits the amount of private benefit that a charity can
provide. 49 For instance, a charity cannot be set up to dredge a waterway where the
primary beneficiaries are private homeowners rather than the public at large. 50 Again,
generally this is designed to prevent abuse of charities by directing them away from
working to help private individuals and businesses instead of and towards helping
charitable beneficiaries. One more provision is worth noting here, Congress prevents
certain charities from engaging in what are known as excess benefit transactions. 51 In
general, this provision imposes a tax upon an individual who has some control over a
charity and uses that control to take from that charity something of value to which they
are not entitled. 52
45F

46F

47F

48F

49F

50F

51F

In order to hold charities accountable for proving their exemption, to ensure the
proper collection of tax revenue, and to provide important information to the public,
charities must annually file a Form 990 with the IRS. 53 I discuss this more below in Part
II(d).
52F

c. Dark Money Organizations
What are ‘dark money organizations’ and how do they relate to tax and political
activities of tax-exempt organizations? Dark money organizations refer to tax-exempt
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Circuit Ct. of Apps. 2000) (noting that the section
501(c)(3) church leaders could form a section 501(c)(4) organization, which in turn could form a Political
Action Committee to speak about a campaign).
46 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) & 1.501(a)-1(c) (defining private shareholder or
individual).
47 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1).
48 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
49 Id; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii) examples.
50 See Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 47 (1966).
51 26 U.S.C. § 4958. This provision applies to public charities (not private foundations) and social welfare
organizations. Congress subjects private foundations to a more restrictive regime including significant
limitations on self-dealing under 26 U.S.C. § 4941.
52 Id.
53 26 U.S.C. § 6033.
45
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organizations that engage in political advocacy that may rise to the level of political
campaign intervention. The moniker “dark” means that the public has little access to
knowledge about who funds these organizations because the organization typically does
not publicly disclose contributions received under campaign finance laws, nor publicly
disclose via the IRS as a section 527 political organization. Social welfare organizations,
described in section 501(c)(4), and business leagues, described in section 501(c)(6), are
the common tax-exempt organizations that fit in the dark money category. Each of these
organizations is exempt from the income tax under section 501(a). Though the IRS used
to require dark money organizations to file information about substantial donors with
the IRS on Schedule B to the Form 990, in 2020, the IRS recently ended the
requirement. 54
53F

What is the benefit of being a tax-exempt social welfare organization or business
league? These organizations are unable to accept charitable contributions deductible by
the donors under section 170 of the Code. However, just like a charity, money earned in
one of these exempt organizations is not subject to the federal income tax as long as the
activity is consistent with the organization’s exempt purpose. 55 Those who contribute to
a social welfare organization, or a business league may be able to deduct contributions
to the organization if the expense qualifies as a business expense, 56 as it typically does in
the case of business league dues, or if the expense qualifies for some other deduction.
Additionally, a donor can contribute appreciated property like stock and not trigger gain
for tax purposes. Conversely, when such property is contributed to a section 527
political organization, gain is triggered to the donor. 57 This provides a way of obtaining
a deduction of a sort and makes the dark money organization a more desirable
destination for such assets than a political organization. Finally, Congress has clarified
that the gift tax does not apply to contributions to either a social welfare organization or
a business league. 58
54F

55F

56F

57F

One other commonality of these two organizations is that if either engages in
exempt function activity as that term is defined in section 527 then as noted above in
Part II(b), the exempt organization owes a tax under section 527(f). 59 The amount of
that tax is set at the lesser of net investment income or the expenditure on the exempt
function activity. 60 If there is no discernible expense to point to, there is no tax;
similarly, if there is no net investment income in the year there is no tax as well. In
Revenue Ruling 2004-6 the IRS provided guidance on when social welfare
organizations, business leagues and labor unions engage in too much exempt function
activity and become subject to the disclosure rules of section 527. 61
58F

59F

60F

54 85 Fed. Reg. 31959 (May 28, 2020) (codified at 26 CFR 56) T.D. 9898. See also Dark Money Darker,
supra note 1.
55 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c)(4), (6). An exempt organization that operates an unrelated business is subject to
the unrelated business income tax though under 26 U.S.C. § 511.
56 26 U.S.C. § 162.
57 Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 84 (donor who contributes appreciated property to 26 U.S.C. § 527 political organization
owes income tax on the gain associated with the appreciated property).
58 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(6).
59 26 U.S.C. § 527.
60 26 U.S.C. § 527(f).
61 Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 328.
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i. Social welfare organizations
Social welfare organizations include “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not
organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare . . . and
no part of the net earnings of such entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual.” 62 The regulations suggest a social welfare purpose is furthered through
“bringing about civic betterments and social improvements.” 63 One court suggested that
such a purpose is found in “a community movement designed to accomplish community
ends.” 64
61F

62F

63F

Studies suggest political organizations in number make up a small part of the
social welfare sector. 65 Social welfare organizations also include health maintenance
organizations, civic social clubs like Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, homeowners’
associations, and kid’s sports clubs. 66 Still, social welfare organizations participate in
political activity in its broadest sense and inject substantial dollars into that world.
Some of that political work furthers a social welfare purpose. For instance, lobbying can
further a social welfare purpose. 67 However, a social welfare organization does not
further its purpose when it intervenes in a political campaign. 68
64F

65F

66F

67F

Though the statute uses the term “exclusively” when describing how much a
social welfare organization must further its exempt purpose, Treasury regulations state
that a social welfare organization must “primarily” further a social welfare purpose. 69
When the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted similar “exclusively” language in the context
of a charitable organization and social security it stated: “an organization must be
devoted to [its exempt] purposes exclusively. This plainly means that the presence of a
single non-[exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption
regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.” 70 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in a social welfare organization case, Contracting Plumbers,
explicitly rejected the idea that the regulation by using the term “primarily” had
liberalized the exclusively standard for a social welfare organization. 71 The court stated:
“we adhere to the rule that the presence of a single substantial non-exempt purpose
precludes exempt status regardless of the number or importance of the exempt
purposes.” 72 In fact, when the IRS rejects the application of a charity or a social welfare
68F

69F

70F

71F

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2).
64 Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1963).
65 JEREMY KHOULISH, FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN F UNDS: T HE HISTORY, A NATOMY AND ACTIVITY OF 501(C)(4)
ORGANIZATIONS, URBAN INSTITUTE, 6 (2016).
66 Id.
67 Rev. Rul. 68–656, 1968–2 C.B. 216.
68 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
69 Id.
70 Better Business Bureau of Washington D.C. v. U.S., 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). This decision predates the
implementation of the unrelated business income tax. Ellen P. Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax Row: How
‘Exclusively’ Became ‘Primarily’, Pac. Standard (June 7, 2013), http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-irsstea-party-tax-row-how-exclusively-became-primarily-59451/.
71 Contracting Plumbers Co-op. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1973).
72 Id.
62
63
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organization and issues a denial letter, it typically uses this formulation, i.e., “you are
operated for a substantial non-exempt purpose.” 73 How is the statutory and regulatory
language operationalized? In other words, what does it mean to be exclusively operated
for a social welfare purpose? How do you measure that? Some attorneys have operated
on the belief that if an organization can maintain its exempt status if it makes sure to
engage in more than fifty percent of expenditures that further its exempt purpose
annually. 74 A corollary to this would be that a social welfare organization can spend 49%
of its time and expenditures on political campaign intervention, as long as the other 50
+ .1 percent is focused on social welfare activity. This position seems to cut against the
language of the Court in Better Business Bureau: an activity that makes up 49% of an
organizations purpose would seem to “substantial in nature.”
72F

73F

It can be difficult for the IRS to make the call between activity that might be
considered issue advocacy and activity that crosses the line into political campaign
intervention. 75 In 2013, the IRS issued proposed regulations with the intent to make it
clearer when such lines are crossed in the social welfare organization context. 76 But, in
Consolidated Appropriations Acts since 2016 Congress has blocked the IRS from
implementing rules to clarify this space. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2022, for example, Congress prohibited the IRS and the Treasury Department from
issuing rules about section 501(c)(4) organizations. 77 It fixes the status of the law
regarding these organizations with the “standard and definitions as in effect on January
1, 2010, which are used to make such determinations . . . for purposes of determining
status under section 501(c)(4) of such Code of organizations created on, before, or after"
the Act. 78
74F

75F

76F

77F

See, e.g., Letter 202216018 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/202216018.pdf (emphasis added).
See Ellen P. Aprill, Examining the Landscape of Section 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations, 21
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 346-47 (2018) (noting that some practitioners take this position); see
also JAMES FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD MAYER, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 496 (5th Ed. 2015)
(noting that the question is a facts and circumstances test but that many practitioners take the position
that as long as the organization does less than fifty percent non-social welfare purpose activity it should
still qualify). The IRS in 2013 after the Tea Party controversy created Letter 5228. In it, the IRS adopted a
safe harbor of a sort for a certain set of organizations where it used a 60% threshold. The IRS would
approve an application of an organization that could represent it would spend 40% or less in time and
expenditures on “on direct or indirect participation or intervention in any political campaign.” I.R.S.
LETTER 5228 (Rev. 9-2013) https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/letter5228.pdf.
75 The IRS consideration of the application for exemption of the major political social welfare organization
associated with Karl Rove, Crossroads GPS is a good example. Though the IRS initially proposed denying
social welfare status to the organization because many of the ads it ran appeared to be political campaign
intervention, the IRS Appeals Office granted the organization status after Crossroads filed an appeal with
the IRS Appeals Office. See Robert Maguire, How Crossroads GPS beat the IRS and Became a Social
Welfare Group, OPEN SECRETS (February 12, 2016) https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/02/howcrossroads-gps-beat-the-irs-and-became-a-social-welfare-group/.
76 Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, (REG134417-13) 78 FR 71535-01, 2013-52 I.R.B. 856, (November 29, 2013).
77 H.R. 2471, Div E, Title I, sec. 123 (2022)
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR2471SA-RCP-117-35.pdf.
78 Id.
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74

10

Like charities, a social welfare organization cannot allow its earnings to inure to
the benefit of a private shareholder or individual. 79 Additionally, the private benefit
limitation discussed with regard to charities in Part II(b), and the tax under section
4958 on excess benefit transactions applies to social welfare organizations like described
above with respect to charities. 80
78F

79F

After legislation in 2015, any organization that intends to operate as a social
welfare organization must provide notice to the IRS of its intention within 60 days of its
formation. 81 The organization files a Form 8976 to meet this notice requirement. Social
welfare organizations must file a Form 990 just like a charity. 82 I will discuss this
requirement more below in Part II(d).
80F

81F

ii. Business leagues
Business leagues present many of the same issues as do social welfare
organizations. They are exempted from the income tax under section 501(c)(6) and
include “[b]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade,
or professional football leagues.” 83 A business league must promote a common business
interest and direct its activities towards the improvement of business conditions in one
or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services
for individual persons. 84 These organizations broadly support various industries or
professions through education, advertising, networking, lobbying. 85 Similarly to social
welfare organizations, a business league is prohibited from allowing its earnings to inure
to a private shareholder or individual. Though the term is not expressly used in the
Treasury Regulations or the Code, it is understood that a business league must primarily
operate for its exempt purpose. 86
82F
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85F

As with social welfare organizations, lobbying is a permissible purpose of a
business league. 87 The Office of the Chief Counsel has determined that political
campaign intervention does not further a business league purpose. 88 The practical
86F

87F

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).
26 U.S.C. § 4958(e) (applicable tax-exempt organization includes “any organization which . . . would be
described in paragraph (3), (4), or (29) of section 501(c) and exempt from tax under section 501(a)”).
81 26 U.S.C. § 506.
82 26 U.S.C. § 6033.
83 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(6).
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)–1.
85 For a detailed discussion of the activities and types of business leagues, see Philip Hackney, Taxing the
Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6) Trade Associations are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92
DEN. U. L. REV. 265 (2015).
86 See, e.g., American Auto Ass’n v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1146, 1159 (1953) (“petitioner was primarily a service
organization. Its Principal activities, as disclosed by our findings of fact, consisted of performing
particular services, and securing benefits of a commercial nature for its members) (emphasis added); see
also, John Francis Reilly, Carter Hull, & Barbara Allen, IRC 501(c)(6) Organizations, I.R.S. EO CPE Text,
K-20 (2003) https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf (“the activities of the organization cannot
be primarily directed to the performance of particular services for individual persons”).
87 Rev. Rul. 61–177, 1961–2 C.B. 117.
88 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969). Campaign finance law also significantly impacts the
operation of business leagues in the political campaign sphere. For instance, a business league, as a
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result of this regime is that business leagues can do unlimited lobbying, assuming it
furthers the organization’s purpose, and can under tax law intervene in a political
campaign as long as that is not the business league’s primary purpose. 89
88F

d. Information Reporting Requirements
Most organizations exempt from income tax under section 501(a) of the Code
must file an annual information return “stating specifically the items of gross income,
receipts, and disbursements, and such other information for the purpose of carrying out
the internal revenue laws.” 90 This is the Form 990, the annual information return for
IRS tax purposes. 91 The return both serves a means of ensuring the organization
complies with its tax status, by providing information that could allow the IRS to detect
if there is any avoidance of tax and provides the public information to hold these
organizations publicly accountable.
89F

90F

The Form 990 in generally available to the public pursuant to the Code, 92 and has
been publicly accessible since 1950. 93 The public disclosure of the returns arguably
brings “some measure of organizational accountability to various constituencies,
including current and prospective donors, organization employees and patrons, other
exempt entities, and the citizenry at large.” 94 The Joint Committee on Taxation has
suggested “[d]isclosure of information regarding tax-exempt organizations also allows
the public to determine whether the organizations should be supported - either through
continued tax benefits and contributions of donors - and whether changes in the laws
regarding such organizations are needed.” 95 The Independent Sector suggests the
unique role of nonprofits in our society as voluntary organizations requires more public
disclosure. 96
91F

92F

93F

94F

95F

Up until recently, most exempt organizations were required to disclose to the
IRS, but not the public, the substantial donors to the organization during the taxable
corporation, is subject to the law that they use “separate segregated funds” as controlled political action
committees to make contributions to candidates for federal political campaigns. 52 U.S.C. 30118; 11 C.F.R.
§§ 114.1(a)(2)(iii) & 114.5.
89 Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Review of the Processing of Referrals Alleging Impermissible Political
Activity by Tax-Exempt Organizations, Ref. Num. 2019-10-006, 3 (Oct. 4, 2018).
90 26 U.S.C. § 6033.
91 I.R.S., FORM 990, RETURN OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf. The IRS and the Treasury Department enacted a regulation in
1942 requiring tax-exempt organizations to file a Form 990 for tax years beginning in 1941. T.D. 5125 (IRS
TD), 1942-1 C.B. 101, 1942. Congress followed that regulation up in 1944 with a requirement for a tax
information return for certain tax-exempt organizations. The Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, 58
Stat. 28 implementing then § 54.
92 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b).
93 Revenue Act of 1950, H.R. 8920, 81st Cong. §341 (1950).
94 Caroline K. Craig, The Internet Brings ‘Cyber-Accountability’ to the Nonprofit Sector, 13 J. TAX’N EX.
ORG. 82 (2001).
95 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th Cong., STUDY OF DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, at 5 (2000); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Promises and Perils of Using Big
Data to Regulate Nonprofits, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1281, 1297-98 (2019).
96 Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool,
12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 212 (2012).
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year. 97 That requirement to disclose substantial donors was required in the first Form
990 for the 1941 tax year. 98 Congress later statutorily required this donor information
from charitable organizations in the 1969 Tax Act. 99 Today, the information is collected
on Schedule B to the Form 990 and requires the disclosure of substantial donors
generally meaning those who donated the greater of $5,000 or 2% of total donations to
the nonprofit during the year. 100 Congress prohibits the public disclosure of the names
and addresses of contributors of all but private foundations and political
organizations. 101 Though the Treasury Department and IRS long required other exempt
organizations to disclose this information via regulation and the Form 990, in 2020, the
Treasury Department and the IRS finalized regulations ending that requirement for all
but charitable organizations. 102
96F
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98F

99F

100F

101F

The ending of the collection of this information was a mistake on the part of the
IRS. The IRS needs the information regarding substantial donors from not just
charitable organizations, but also the dark money organizations in order to protect the
revenue and as a means to deter tax avoidance. The ending of the collection of that
information also likely impacts the integrity of the campaign finance system as
individuals can contribute to social welfare organizations with the knowledge that there
is no information going to any part of the government regarding these contributions.
To police the inurement provision, the IRS needs to know substantial
contributors because these are individuals who can control the organization. 103 The IRS
has no reliable way to know this information withoutthe exempt organization directly
disclosing it to the IRS. Substantial donors are not public facing in the way officers and
directors of a nonprofit corporation are public facing. The same goes for enforcing the
excess benefit transaction tax imposed for charities and social welfare organizations.
The IRS needs to know the individuals who control the organization and substantial
102F

I.R.S., FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM TAX, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990.pdf.
98 See Form 990 EO CPE Text describing how the 1941 Form 990 required disclosure of substantial
donors (those donating $4,000 or more) Form 990. Done initially in 1943 to develop the information
needed to determine whether the organizations at hand ought to be exempt from taxation. See Senate
Finance Committee Report in the Revenue Bill of 1943, p. 21.
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SRpt78-627.pdf The Revenue Act of 1943 was not
enacted until February 1944 because of a Presidential Veto. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-atlarge/78th-congress/session-2/c78s2ch63.pdf Pub. L. No. 235, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 25, 1944).
99 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
100 Schedule B, Form 990, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf.
101 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b).
102 Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 85
Fed. Reg. 31959 (May 28, 2020) (codified at 26 CFR 56) T.D. 9898.
103 The Supreme Court recently struck down as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment a
state law in California requiring charities soliciting donations in the state of California to disclose
substantial donors identified on Schedule B to the IRS Form 990. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.
Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (2021). I submitted an amicus brief in Americans for Prosperity along with eleven
other nonprofit scholars supporting the state of California in its effort to protect its ability to require this
donor information from charities. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Law of Non-Profit Organizations
in Support of Respondent, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373 (2021) (Nos. 19251 & 19-255). The Court was careful to note that its opinion applied to neither campaign finance nor to
tax law. Id. at 2389.
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contributors fall into this category. 104 The IRS cannot truly enforce this tax Congress
imposed without the information. Substantial contributor information can aid the IRS
in enforcing the private benefit limitation as well. Finally, if the IRS wants to keep track
of related dark money organizations that might try to avoid the primarily test by
working in tandem to maximize the amount of money they can use to engage in political
campaign intervention, Schedule B can provide essential information to see such
relationships. 105
103F

104F

Requiring disclosure to the IRS acts as a deterrent to tax avoidance as well. 106
The Treasury Department notes that tax noncompliance is highest where there is no
third-party reporting. 107 The Treasury Department highlights the need to “strengthen
reporting requirements,” 108 and notes that enforcement activity itself is not a driver of
reducing the tax gap. 109 In its 2001 study, the IRS found that about 45% of compliance
has to do with information reporting. 110 Given the significant lack of enforcement of the
tax laws from the IRS as discussed below in Part III, ending this requirement to disclose
substantial donors becomes even more damaging.
105F

106F

107F
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109F

The tax law in the exempt organization space works in part as a back-up to
campaign finance law. In addition to tax law, Congress regulates many nonprofit
organizations to the extent they are engaged in campaign finance. 111 Nonprofits have
long been involved in the electoral system, 112 and the United States has tried to regulate
the campaign finance of corporate entities since 1907 when Congress enacted the
Tillman Act under President Theodore Roosevelt. 113 This system of law focuses on
expenditure limits, contribution limits, and disclosure. Though a series of cases over the
years has struck down certain parts of the system enacted by Congress, it remains in
110F

111F

112F

26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(3)(B)(i) (including “substantial contributor” in the group of individuals who can
violate the excess benefit transaction tax).
105 The idea here is a donor could contribute $1 million to a social welfare organization. That first social
welfare organization could spend 49% on political campaign intervention and send 50% of the money to
another social welfare organization. That second organization does the same thing. Via this strategy, the
organization theoretically is accomplishing social welfare organization purposes through contributing to
another social welfare organization but is indeed almost exclusively accomplishing political campaign
activity. It is hard to see how such a scheme could be considered to qualify under section 501(c)(4), but
without the donor information on Schedule B it should be much more difficult for the IRS to detect such
transactions. Schedule I to the Form 990 helps in part but the Schedule B combined with the Schedule I
would enable the IRS to see such transactions quicker and more reliably.
106 See Dark Money Darker, supra note 1, at 170-75.
107 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX
GAP 8 (2006), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/comprehensive_strategy.pdf.
108 Id. at 9.
109 Id. at 13.
110 See I.R.S., Tax Year 2001 Tax Gap Update 2 (2007); see also Leandra Lederman, Essay: Reducing
Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1733, 1738 (2010).
111 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-455).
112 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, When Soft Law Meets Hard Politics: Taming the Wild West of Nonprofit
Political Involvement, 45 J. LEGIS. 194, 196 (2019).
113 Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). See Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003)
(holding that the corporate political contribution ban applied to nonprofit corporations).
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force today. 114 Knowledge of donors to nonprofits is relevant to the enforcement of that
law. For instance, the system prohibits foreign actors from contributing to campaigns
for public office or making expenditures for political campaigns. 115 To the extent a social
welfare organization takes money from foreign operators to influence a campaign, the
FEC cares. Some argue indeed that the lack of public disclosure of substantial donors to
social welfare organizations is making nonprofits a disclosure shelter, and thereby
undermining the nonprofit sector’s credibility. 116
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114F

115F

The IRS in its final regulations eliminating the disclosure requirement suggested
that neither campaign finance nor state nonprofit law was part of its mission. It argued,
thus, that it need not consider comments suggesting that it was important for the IRS to
maintain the requirement to help states enforce nonprofit law and campaign finance
laws. I have argued that the IRS was wrong that it need not take other law into
consideration. Congress has designed the tax law to work in tandem with other
enforcement agencies both federal and state and local. 117
116F

What penalties does the IRS have at hand to manage failures to file Form 990s or
false information on Form 990s?
Section 6652 penalizes either a failure to file an information return or to file a
complete return. 118 The penalty on the organization is $20 a day with a maximum for
smaller organizations of $10,000 and of larger organizations at $50,000. 119 The IRS has
stated that a return that leaves out material information is an incomplete return that can
be penalized. 120 The IRS has suggested that “materiality depends upon what the Service
requires to administer the tax laws.” 121 Additionally there are criminal penalties, such
section 7206 which applies when someone “[w]illfully makes and subscribes any return,
statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that
it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and
correct as to every material matter.” 122 These criminal charges require a high burden of
proof and are not often used by the IRS except typically in egregious cases.
117F

118F

119F

120F

121F

114 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010)
115 52 U.S.C. §30121; 11 C.F.R. § 110.20. See Norman I. Silber, Foreign Corruption of the Political Process
through Social Welfare Organizations, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 104 (2019).
116 Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political Organizations: Ending the Plague of Inconsistency, 21
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUP. POL’Y 481 (2018).
117 For example, Congress enhanced 26 U.S.C. § 527 in 2000 to augment the FEC’s roll in overseeing
campaign finance by creating an IRS reporting regime for those political organizations that did not need
to file reports with the FEC. Congress directs the IRS to work with state agencies as they revoke
exemption from charitable organizations in 26 U.S.C § 6104. As a practical matter the IRS works regularly
with other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Department of Labor to ensure that the federal laws are enforced.
118 26 U.S.C. § 6652(c).
119 Id.
120 I.R.S. Office of Chief Counsel, PMTA 01357, Memorandum from James Brokaw to David Fish, Nov. 2,
2007. https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta01357_7359.pdf. Rev. Rul. 77-162.
121 Id.
122 26 U.S.C. 7206.
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III.

IRS Enforcement

What resources does the IRS have at its disposal to ensure taxpayers are
complying with the law? A review of the trend over the past 10 years suggests the IRS
does not have the resources, human or capital, needed to enforce the current tax law. 123
Furthermore, the IRS places low budget priority on the exempt organization sector
likely because it delivers little in tax revenue. 124
122F

123F

While the economy grew, Congress shrunk the IRS budget over the past decade.
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) reports that the IRS budget fell by 20% in real
(inflation adjusted) dollars between 2010 and 2018. 125 This resulted in a 22% decrease
in employees working at the agency, and a 30% decline in enforcement employees. 126
IRS Data Books show the IRS went from over 94,000 full time equivalent (“FTEs”)
employees in FY 2010 to 73,554 FTEs in FY 2019. 127 Furthermore, some of the most
specialized employees in the enforcement sphere saw declines of 35% for revenue agents
and 48% for revenue officers. 128 Individual examinations fell by 46% in that period with
only 0.6% of individuals facing an examination by the end of that period. 129 While high
income individuals were generally audited at a rate higher than other individuals, the
audits of high-income individuals fell at a greater rate than all other individuals. 130
Corporate examinations fell by 37%. 131
124F

125F

126F

127F

128F

129F

130F

What happened to the IRS in its tax-exempt organization group? The
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in 2014 recognized that the budget cuts at
the IRS led to less enforcement in the tax-exempt sector. 132 The IRS workforce on
exempt organization matters shrank about 5% from 2010 (889 FTEs) to 2013 (842
FTEs). 133 That workforce then shrank significantly to around 550 FTEs by FY 2019. 134
There was a change in the exempt organizations group at the IRS after the Tea Party
controversy of 2013 135 where many employees of exempt organizations moved over to
131F

132F

133F

134F

See, e.g., Paul Keil & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS was Gutted, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11, 2018). See also
Leandra Lederman, The IRS, Politics, and Income Inequality, TAX NOTES, 1329 (March 14, 2016).
124 Much of this Part II(d) comes from Dark Money Darker, supra note 1, at 175-79.
125 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE’S FUNDING AND
ENFORCEMENT, 1 (2020).
126 Id.
127 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK, 74 Table 31 (2019); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK,
66 Table 29 (2010).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 2.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 GAO, BETTER COMPLIANCE INDICATORS AND DATA , AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS
WOULD STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, 19 (2014).
133 Id.
134 IRS, TEGE, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ACCOMPLISHMENTS, Pub. 5329 (2020).
135 For more on this matter see Philip T. Hackney, Should the IRS Never ‘Target’ Taxpayers? A
Consideration of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. L. REV. 453 (2015). The Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (TIGTA) later concluded that the IRS treated both conservative and liberal groups in
the same way in the IRS determination process. Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Review of Selected
Criteria Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review, Ref. Num. 2017-10-054 (September 28,
2017) https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201710054fr.pdf. The Senate Finance
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the Chief Counsel to manage guidance projects from that office. In 2014, it was reported
that around forty-five employees from the IRS were being moved over to the Office of
Chief Counsel of the IRS in a realignment. 136 However, even if forty-five moved over,
that does not explain the precipitous drop.
135F

The main functions of the exempt organizations group are running an application
system called the determinations process, and an examination program. In
determinations, as annual applications have increased annual rejections from the IRS
have significantly decreased. 137 In FY 2019, the IRS reviewed over 101,000 applications
for exempt status, it rejected only 66 of those applications. 138 Comparatively, in FY
2010, the IRS reviewed over 65,000 of such applications and rejected 517. 139
Admittedly, a large number of applicants withdraw their applications before denial and
this statistic has the potential to be misleading. When looking at examinations, it is
impossible to have a perfect figure given the way the data is reported in the IRS Data
Book, but of all the returns filed and all the returns examined in 2010, which likely
includes some double counting of organizations (and includes sizable employment tax
returns), the IRS had about a .38% examination rate. 140 In 2019, comparatively, even
with the double counting problem, the examination rate shrinks to 0.15% at best. 141
TIGTA counted the rate in 2019 at 0.13%. 142
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This erosion of the IRS workforce and enforcement happened while the taxexempt sector grew. Though a comparison of IRS data between 2010 and 2019 seems to
suggest that total tax-exempt organizations shrunk, 143 the sector has grown in size of
assets. It is difficult to get good current statistics on nonprofits. There are many
problems with the data from the IRS including the fact that not all organizations file
returns 144 or do not file returns that provide any significant data, 145 and we have no
reason to believe all organizations file their returns accurately. Nevertheless, a look at
IRS data from Forms 990 suggests assets and revenue have increased quite a bit in the
142F
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144F

Committee’s Bipartisan Investigative Report concluded similarly in 2015. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE,
THE I.R.S.'S PROCESSING OF 501(C)(3) AND 501(C)(4) APPLICATIONS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS SUBMITTED BY
“POLITICAL ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS FROM 2010-2013, Sen. Rep. 114-119 (August 5, 2015)
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/114th-congress/senate-report/119/1
136 Diane Freda, Move of 45 IRS TE/GE Employees to Chief Counsel’s Office Slated for FY 2015,
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (May 14, 2014). Some of those forty-five came from employee plans. One article
from the time suggests it was only twenty-two employees from the exempt organizations group that
moved over. Lauren Simpson, IRS Controversy and Restructuring, NONPROFIT LAW BLOG (May 29, 2014)
https://www.pbwt.com/exempt-org-resource-blog/nonprofit-law-blogirs-controversy-changes-tege.
137 Philip Hackney, The Real IRS Scandal has more to do with Budget Cuts than Bias, THE CONVERSATION
(April 15, 2018).
138 IRS, DATA BOOK, 27, Table 12 (2019).
139 IRS, DATA BOOK, 56, Table 24 (2010).
140 IRS, DATA BOOK, 4, Table 2, 33, Table 13 (2010).
141 IRS, DATA BOOK, 4, Table 2, & 54 Table 21 (2019).
142 Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Obstacles Exist in Detecting Noncompliance of Tax-Exempt
Organizations, Ref. No. 2921-10-013, 6 (2021).
143 IRS, DATA BOOK, 56, Table 25 (2010); IRS, DATA BOOK, 30 Table 14 (2019).
144 After Congress added 26 U.S.C. § 6033(h) to the Code in 2006, and the IRS implemented what it calls
the Form 990-N (e-Postcard), churches are likely far and away the largest group of charities that file no
IRS return.
145 Form 990-N provides little in the way of information regarding the organization.
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sector over the decade. 146 In 2010, with a little over 186,000 charitable organization
Form 990s filed, the charitable sector held over $2.9 trillion in assets and almost $1.6
trillion in revenue. 147 In comparison, in 2017 over 217,000 charitable organizations filed
Form 990s reporting over $4.3 trillion in assets and almost $2.3 trillion in revenue. 148
Using that same data, again from reporting on Forms 990, for exempt organizations
including 501(c)(4)-(9) in 2010 there were approximately $547 billion in assets and
$360 billion in revenue. 149 In 2017, those amounts grew to approximately $767 billion
in assets and $387 billion in revenue. 150
145F

146F

147F

148F

149F

Thus, the enforcement environment for the IRS is poor both at the IRS in general
and at the division that oversees tax-exempt organizations in particular. When
compared to the size of the sector the IRS is reviewing, the idea that the IRS might be
able to use human resource heavy examinations to ensure compliance is laughable. It is
not going to work. Though I will not go into this here, state enforcement is even more
anemic. Efforts, such as those recommended by GAO, for the IRS to make better use of
data available is going to be the only way the IRS in this current environment can make
headway against tax abuse. Robust information reporting thus needs to be the norm.
As noted above, the IRS often has given short shrift to the tax-exempt
organization enforcement side of its house. This is likely in part because the sector
simply does not generate revenue, and it comes with enforcement that has potential
political danger if not handled with care. Nevertheless, it seems possible and important
for the IRS to do more in this space with publicly available campaign spending reports
filed with the FEC. Many cases noted by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington where social welfare organizations represent one thing to the FEC
regarding making independent expenditures and then reporting nothing to the IRS on
the Form 990 are troubling. Such cases seem to present prima facie cases of substantial
political campaign intervention that at the least ought to be investigated. They also
present questionable statements on Form 990s.
IV.

Conclusion

Thank you for inviting me to speak about the laws and enforcement governing
the political activities of tax-exempt organizations. The tax laws are built fairly well to
prohibit the deduction of campaign expenditures and to promote a strong nonprofit
sector. There are problems with that architecture. For instance, Congress could consider
requiring donors to recognize gain on the contribution of appreciated assets to a dark
money organization. This would end an indirect means of deducting political activity.
Additionally, it would help if the IRS were permitted to issue rules clarifying the
boundaries of political campaign activity for social welfare organizations. However, the
legal architecture works reasonably well in theory to ensure the government is not
IRS, SOI Tax Stats—Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organization Tax Statistics, Form 990—Balance
Sheet and Income Statement Items.
147 Id. 2010.
148 Id. 2017.
149 Id.
150 Id.
146
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subsidizing campaign-related contributions through the Code and to ensure a wellordered nonprofit sector. That said, the current anemic IRS budget, the lack of
enforcement action by the IRS, and the failure to collect substantial donor information
from dark money organizations creates a crisis. There is good reason to believe that
taxpayers are able to take advantage, and indeed are taking advantage, of this system.
These factors undermine confidence in the tax system, the equal enforcement of the law,
and our ability to operate a fair democratic system. Therefore, I urge Congress to
increase the IRS budget to a level that allows the IRS the ability to properly enforce the
tax laws. But, institutionally, I believe the IRS needs to be pushed and given support to
enforce these laws that help work toward a more fair democratic order.
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